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FROM BLACK BOX TO ʻOPENʼ BRAIN  
Law, Neuroimaging and Disability Discrimination 
Karen O’Connell* 
The brain is commonly thought of as a bounded and private 
organ of selfhood – a repository of individual thoughts and 
desires, a ʻblack boxʼ closed against incursions. Yet 
contemporary neuroimaging technologies seem to open the 
brain to scrutiny, offering a selfhood that is increasingly 
transparent, knowable and manipulable. On one view, this 
recasts the brain as a site of potential regulation, subject to the 
language of self-discipline, law and medical intervention. Yet 
there is also a disruptive element to these technologies, as 
they reveal the brain to be embedded in overlapping biological, 
social and environmental systems, interdependent and in 
constant change over time. This article considers the 
significance of these developments for law, with particular 
reference to the construction of disabled identity and the brain 
in discrimination law. Will this sense of openness in the brain 
merely provide opportunities for increased medical regulation, 
in which law is bypassed, and neuroimaging technologies 
facilitate the identification of risk in individuals and mitigation of 
that risk through neurochemical and other brain interventions? 
Reading these technological developments alongside current 
theories of disability and neurodiversity, this article offers an 
alternative view of legal selfhood in which the brain is neither a 
black box nor an object to be screened and controlled, but 
open in a more radical sense, inseparable from its functioning 
within the body and environment, constituted by and 
constitutive of the Other. 
A popular metaphor for  the ‘old’ brain is a black box: a recording device 
that shuts away memories, experiences and dreams, and reveals its contents 
mysteriously and unreliably. On this view of the brain, identity-formation 
happens in the context of a deep and possibly unknowable interior life. Yet 
as brain screening technologies such as functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI), which maps brain function through scanning changes in 
oxygenation levels, are integrated into our sense of biological selfhood, the 
brain has come to be seen as open to examination and interpretation by 
                                                           
*  Chancellor’s Postdoctoral Research Fellow, University of Technology, Sydney (UTS). 
I am grateful for comments offered on an earlier draft of this article by Professor Isabel 
Karpin and Dr Honni van Rijswijk, UTS. This article also benefited from comments and 
questions by participants in the symposium, ‘The Laws of Technology and the 
Technology of Law’ held at Griffith Law School, Griffith University, 3 May 2011 and a 
faculty research seminar at UTS, 17 August 2011. 
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experts. These technologies present a fundamental disruption to the black 
box model and an urgent intellectual moment in which the relationship of the 
brain to identity and to social institutions such as law may be reconsidered. 
In place of the black box, there are two emerging models of a brain-
based identity: a narrowly individual ‘control’ model in which the brain is 
regulated through screening and biological intervention, and an ‘open’ 
model that situates the brain in its environment and in relationship to others. 
I argue in favour of an open model, in which the brain is inseparable from its 
functioning within the body and embedded in overlapping biological, social 
and environmental systems. On this view, new brain technologies invite us 
to acknowledge that we are always constituted by and constitutive of the 
Other. With the open model, the brain is viewed in a temporal and relational 
context, always becoming, and interdependent with its surrounding and 
overlapping systems. The radical openness and interdependency that is a 
possible view of the ‘new’ brain suggests a new kind of ethics that flows 
from this revised selfhood. 
It also suggests new possibilities for law. In disability discrimination 
laws, which deal intimately with identity and the body, law has some 
precedent for a regulatory model that acknowledges the interaction of social 
institutions, communities and individual biology in shaping identity. This 
article considers each of the brain models – black box, control model and 
open brain – and their implications for law, with reference to Australian 
disability discrimination laws and a group of people who define themselves 
as neurologically ‘diverse’ rather than disabled, and who might be expected 
to benefit from a more expansive approach to brain-based identity.  
The Black Box 
Throughout the past century, the idea of a deep interior space was a 
commonplace of culture and society.1 The competing disciplines of 
psychiatry, psychology and psychoanalysis helped to establish and entrench 
this idea, both indirectly through the conflicts and dissonance in the 
burgeoning industries of self-knowledge, and directly – for example, through 
psychoanalytic ideas of selfhood.2 At the heart of psychoanalysis was the 
idea that perfect self-knowledge was never achievable, but rather an ongoing 
effortful process of work and exploration.3 An unruly interior – with layers 
                                                           
1  As Rose (2007), p 26 puts it: ‘Throughout the first 60 years of the twentieth century 
human beings came to understand themselves as inhabited by a deep interior 
psychological space, and to evaluate themselves and act upon themselves in terms of this 
belief.’ 
2  Each of these disciplines also contains within it an enormous diversity of approaches and 
beliefs. A classic example lies in the divergences between Freudian, Jungian, Lacanian 
and Kleinian psychoanalysis. 
3  For example, Freud’s description of the repressed impulse sees such impulses as 
struggling towards consciousness but being internally censored and only breaking through 
into conscious mind indirectly, through the passage of dreams or other indirect means, via 
the use or misuse of memories. Grosz (1990), p 87 writes: ‘The unconscious wish 
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and subterranean currents of which we are dimly or fleetingly aware, fuelled 
by subconscious drives and desires – was a crucial component of our sense 
both of depth and of mystery. These depths of mind, making us 
fundamentally unknowable, were also crucial to our sense of a private self, 
since what is unknowable is also untranslatable.  
Along with this idea of the mind-brain as mysterious and unknowable 
came an image of the brain as structurally unchanging, a kind of container 
for the contents of the mind. This offered a sense of boundary and a barrier 
against incursion. Thoughts, dreams and desires – albeit fragmented and 
contradictory – were ours alone, to share or to keep ‘inside’. Law’s role in 
boundary-keeping has ensured that it has an expected role to play in 
protecting the mind’s ‘container’, specifically through reiterating and 
shoring up a distinction between public and private life, a role that 
traditionally has shielded the internal domain from regulation.4 In addition, 
this legal role is crucial to the perpetuation of the liberal subject, the 
autonomous individual who is literally ‘self-contained’; a self-in-a-box, 
surrounded by other boxed selves who, whether familiar or strange, are all 
shut off and fundamentally unknowable. This bounded view of the brain, 
and therefore of the self, is under threat, but it nevertheless persists in 
political, economic and popular discourse, as well as in law, where we may 
be thought of as ‘lords of our tiny, skull-sized kingdoms, alone at the center 
of all creation’.5 
I am calling the deeply entrenched idea of a bounded, mysterious brain 
the ‘black box’ approach. A black box is a metaphor of known inputs and 
outputs passing through a bounded, shut-off interior. The black box is a 
commonly employed metaphor for the structurally static, but mysterious 
brain. Reid and Baylis, for example, refer to the ‘Decade of the Brain’ in the 
1990s, as ‘an effort to shed light into the “black box” of the human brain’.6 It 
is also employed as a container metaphor to locate our human vitality and 
intellect in the physical brain. The brain of physicist Stephen Hawking, who 
has motor neurone disease, is described by a New York Times journalist as ‘a 
pinging black box amid the physical wreckage’.7  
The brain as black box has an ethical application beyond its 
significance for medical or legal selfhood. Butler claims that our 
unknowability is a foundation for an ethical relation to others, since 
                                                                                                                              
reactivates a memory (either recent or infantile) which will serve to express or represent it 
in the manifest dream. This may enable it to gain a (compromised, disguised) access to 
consciousness.’ 
4  The distinction between regulated public and unregulated private life has long been a 
target of criticism by feminist legal scholars. O’Donovan (1985), p 9 writes that: ‘The 
elaboration in legal discourse of a private domain of subjectivity, morality and the 
personal as “not the law’s business” has inevitably led to non-intervention in domestic 
life.’ See also Fineman and Mykitiuk (1994) and Thornton (1995). 
5  Wallace (2009). 
6  Reid and Baylis (2005), p 21. 
7  ‘Many Kinds of Universes, and None Require God’ New York Times, 7 September 2010.  
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affirming what is opaque and unknown in one’s self ‘may allow one to 
affirm others who may or may not “mirror” one’s own constitution’.8 In 
other words, by being forced to acknowledge that we are strangers to 
ourselves, we are ethically primed for accepting otherness; the stranger 
within orients us to the stranger without. The failure to give a full account of 
ourselves marks us in a relation of humility to others, since we cannot 
present ourselves to them in full self-knowledge, and we must therefore 
forgive those ‘who are also constituted in partial opacity to themselves’.9  
The shared strangeness of being that Butler identifies is one possible 
source of ethics, but not the only one. For the purpose of this article, the 
question is: If we lose our sense of unknowability, what other prompts to an 
ethical relation will shape relations with the Other? This question arises 
because ethical uncertainty about ourselves, the incoherence and 
unknowable depths of our interior selves, is under threat from new ways of 
thinking about the brain and the self, triggered in part by neurological 
technologies such as brain scanning and associated interventions.  
Unlocking the Box 
Into the ‘black box’ vision of the brain comes the incursion of visual 
technologies and their computer-aided imaging, making the body more open 
to scientific representation and appraisal.10 Heightened public interest in the 
brain in particular has been triggered by the increasing use of brain imaging 
technologies, most commonly fMRI. This procedure measures changes in 
the oxygenation of blood made by neurons as they activate and consume 
oxygen. It is an indirect measure of brain activity, in which researchers can 
make inferences about brain processes by analysing a continuous set of 
images recording brain activity, collected at a rate of every few seconds over 
a period of half an hour or more, while the screened participant undertakes a 
directed activity.11 The resulting pictures of the brain, lit up with artificial 
colour, are constructions rather than a simple transcription of visual cues, the 
kind of scientific representation that utilises what Ihde terms ‘second sight’ 
because ‘it is a translation into the visible of phenomena that lie beyond 
literal vision’.12 
In tandem with other brain imaging technologies, from the EEG and 
MEG to PET scans, fMRI gives a sense of seeing ‘inside’ the brain. This has 
an inevitably disruptive effect on the black box model since, as Waldby puts 
it: ‘The humanist commitment to the unknowable interior is necessarily 
destabilized by any attempt to treat the interior as itself surface.’13 New 
                                                           
8  Butler (2005), p 41. 
9  Butler (2005), p 42. 
10  See Waldby (2000). This, in turn, takes place against a broader theme of what Ihde calls a 
scientific culture of ‘visualism’: Ihde (2002), Ch 3. 
11  Rees (2011), p 19. 
12  Ihde (2002), p 47. 
13  Waldby (2000), p 159. 
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visualising and interventionist technologies that seem to ‘open up’ the brain 
are continually being reported.14 However, while visual depictions of brain 
anatomy are powerful enough, the visual depiction of ‘function’ is what sets 
fMRI apart. Function, in the brain, stands for dreams, memories, decision-
making, secrets and emotions, the content of our most private selves. Brain 
scanning of function allows scientists to assert that there is no inherently 
unknowable interior space: ‘non-invasive imaging technologies … have 
provided overwhelming evidence that even our most “private” thoughts, 
decisions and emotions are preceded by the activation of defined networks 
of neurons’.15 In other words, the ‘container’ function of the brain is no 
longer a barrier against incursion – or at least incursion in the form of the 
technologically competent ‘expert’. 
With its promise of revealing the internal contents of our minds via the 
‘second sight’ of the expert, the fMRI has captured the attention of scientists 
and the general public alike, and in recent years there has been a steady 
stream of media reports and popular articles ‘translating’ scanning research 
into private areas of public interest: health, relationships, sexuality, gender 
and child rearing, to name a few.16 Contemporary research into the brain is 
often described as an ‘unlocking’: the black box of our brain is being opened 
and examined.17 For instance, in one brain-scanning experiment, scientists 
showed that they could tell what the scanned individual was going to decide 
well before the subject was aware that they had made up their mind. In this 
experiment, while the research subject was lying in the MRI machine, 
weighing up his or her options (whether to press a button with a right or left 
finger), neuronal activity showed that the choice was already made, and the 
scientists could ‘read’ and record this decision up to ten seconds before the 
subject had consciously decided.18 This leaves the scientist seemingly in 
                                                           
14  For example, as I was writing this article a new way of processing MRI data was reported 
that maps myelin, the protective coating of neurons: Glasser and Van Essen (2011). 
Previously, such maps could only be made with dissection, not on a living brain. Another 
technology, that literally shines light into the brain, reported on recently in Wired 
magazine as one of the ‘Seven creepy technologies that could teach us so much (if they 
weren’t so wrong)’ is optogenetics, currently being carried out on mice, which switches 
on and off individual neurons by targeting them directly with light (after genetically 
modifying them to be light sensitive). Human application is clearly problematic – or 
‘creepy’ to use Wired’s term – but researchers have nevertheless claimed insights into 
human disorders such as autism using this method. ‘Seven Creepy Technologies That 
Could Teach Us So Much (If They Weren’t So Wrong)’, Wired, 15 July 2011. 
15  Singer (2011), p 42. 
16  See, for example, ‘Scientists Discover True Love’, The Sunday Times (UK), 4 January 
2009; ‘Rejection Really Hurts, Brain Scans Show’, National Geographic News, 28 March 
2011; ‘The Brain Scans That Prove Couples Share a “Sixth Sense”’, The Daily Mail (UK), 
27 September 2010; ‘Secrets of the Female Orgasm Uncovered’, Sydney Morning Herald, 
9 November 2010. For an academic analysis of neuroscience research in the popular 
domain, see Racine (2010), Ch 5. 
17  See, for example, Ramachandran (2011). 
18  Singer (2011), p 43. 
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possession of what on the black box model would have been an 
‘unknowable’, subconscious component of thought, disrupting any sense of 
privacy from the outside world. Neuroscientist Michael Gazziniga writes 
that ‘[n]euroscience also tells us that by the time any of us consciously 
experience something, the brain has already done its work … This raises the 
question, are we out of the loop?’19  
The newly celebrated plasticity of the brain works in tandem with 
function scanning to intensify the idea that the brain is not a closed box. 
While plasticity research is not dependent on fMRI for its insight into the 
brain – observational studies and invasive animal experimentation are 
among other research methods that have played key roles – scanning 
certainly demonstrates the existence of plastic change. More importantly, 
plasticity reveals a brain in constant modification according to the external 
environment: ‘perpetually altered by every encounter, every interaction’.20 
This idea is discussed further below, but for now the crucial point is that 
plasticity further undermines the ‘black box’ model of the brain by showing 
it to be continuously open, interactive and changing. Furthermore, while 
opening up the brain is a precursor to therapeutic intervention, ‘rendering the 
human brain plastic has made it more amenable to therapy’.21 
The Control Model 
The idea, courtesy of brain imaging technologies, of brains as readable and 
changeable has so far offered the public domain a positive and satisfying 
experience of control. The prevalence and popularity of books on brain 
management demonstrate this, as does the ubiquity of popular magazine and 
newspaper articles representing the brain as able to be rejuvenated, with 
sufficient attention to ‘exercise’ – or what is now termed ‘neurobics’.22 These 
self-improvement texts tap into the deep Western anxiety around ageing, and 
expand the promise that by exercising the body (along with a host of other 
purportedly age-defying interventions) physical decline can be staved off. 
While the brain was viewed as static and slowly declining, it posed a threat 
to the fantasy of endlessly prolonged vitality. With visibility and the 
possibility of change, the brain becomes another organ to be exercised ‘as 
                                                           
19  Gazzaniga (2005), p 89. 
20  Doidge (2010), p 209. 
21  Rubin (2009), p 421. She adds: ‘Undoubtedly, structural plasticity adds a further 
therapeutic dimension to the existing neuroscientific catalogue, implying that not only the 
function of synaptic connections might be modulated by the administration of proper 
treatments, but also their very existence might be amenable to therapeutic measures.’  
22  A few examples of such titles, currently being advertised at a local bookstore, are: 
R Restak and S Kim, The Playful Brain: The Surprising Science of How Puzzles Improve 
Your Mind; Michael J Valenzuela, Maintain Your Brain: What You Can Do to Improve 
Your Brain’s Health and Avoid Dementia; Daniel G Amen Change Your Brain, Change 
Your Body; and John Medina, Brain Rules:12 Principles for Surviving and Thriving at 
Work, Home and School. 
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though it were a muscle’,23 with crosswords, Nintendo games, Sudoku, 
omega 3 supplements and daily moderate exercise – or, more intensively, 
with brain devices and neurofeedback.24 
While this quite dramatic and intense sense of control over our brains 
imparts the pleasurable fantasy that we will not be helplessly subjected to 
natural forces of age and decline, and so perhaps will be able to cheat or 
postpone death, it also has a more subtle and wearying effect. This is in the 
maintenance of what Rose calls the ‘neurochemical self’, a self whose 
internal life – thoughts, desires, feelings, decisions – is mapped on the body, 
and specifically the brain.25 The neurochemical self is one that, in constant 
interaction with health and other experts, is always attendant to bodily risk 
and to the conscientious management and mitigation of risk. Therapeutic 
intervention is reshaped by the neurochemical self, which in assessing and 
managing risks, self-regulates. In this, Rose is presenting a version of 
Foucauldian technologies of the self adapted to contemporary biosocial 
practices.26 Neuroscience and its visual techniques have become some of the 
practices by which we form our selves. 
The anxious self-regulation associated with openness and visibility is 
encouraged by the way that fMRI, even as it opens the interior of the brain 
for study, permits a continuation of the ‘black box’ model in one respect: it 
presents the brain in isolation from the body. The image of the brain on the 
screen, lighting up on its own, directs focus to the organ itself, and truncates 
the view of any other part of the body that may be involved in its 
functioning. Even the title of the popular book The Brain That Changes 
Itself27 reflects the persistent idea that the brain is an individual unit – an 
agent, even, of its own destiny – shaping itself, regulating itself. Yet an 
arguably more accurate way to represent openness and plasticity would be 
the more reactive: ‘The Brain That is Changed by Others’, or even better: 
‘The Brain That is Embedded in Otherness’. How we might ‘see’ such a 
brain is explored below. 
The Open Brain 
The Technological Moment 
The ability to see brain functioning, and the disruption to the black box 
model, allow a more radical questioning of how we think of the brain. 
Indeed, at this point of using fMRI to ‘see’ thought processes, we are at a 
moment of heightened transparency that occurs when new technologies 
create a schism in an accepted pattern of thought, and allow for the 
perceived natural order of things to be overturned. This moment of visibility 
                                                           
23  Doidge (2010), p 36.  
24  See Brenninkmeijer (2010). 
25  Rose (2007), p 188. 
26  See Martin et al (1988). 
27  Doidge (2010). 
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as a technology emerges takes place in what Waldby calls ‘the lag between 
an innovation and its domestication’.28 In this moment, technologies can 
provide, in Franklin’s term, a ‘defamiliarizing lens’,29 allowing us to see the 
world anew. 
Neuroscientists share a high degree of consensus about the basic nature 
of the brain and the mind/self, seeing the mind as biologically based. In its 
strongest form this biological view is ‘a fully fledged reductionist collapse 
which sees mind as merely the epiphenomenological product of brain’.30 
Science writer and neurobiologist Lone Frank, who refers to herself as ‘a 
bag of neurons’,31 expresses the reductionist turn more floridly, calling this 
anchoring of the formerly incorporeal into exchanges of chemicals and 
electrical signals a ‘neurorevolution’. ‘Religion is gone,’ she writes, ‘moral 
choice … is ascribed to automatic processes that are planted in us all by a 
blind, value-neutral evolution.’32 
However, this consensus of belief does not exist outside of the 
neurosciences, where ideas about brains, consciousness and an array of 
associated concepts are contested. Martin writes that although a brain-based 
account of consciousness is almost universally accepted in the 
neurosciences, explanations of brains – what they consist of and what they 
do – are highly contentious in other academic disciplines and the public 
domain: ‘Instead of a certain take-over by a newly dominant paradigm, we 
are witnessing an open moment whose outcome is far from clear.’33 The 
‘technological moment’ of visibility is here for brains, a chance to consider 
which elements of a brain-based account of identity should be integrated into 
attendant laws and norms regulating bodies. 
Law and the Technological Moment 
What might this particular ‘technological moment’ mean for law? Much has 
been written of the possible challenges to law of current shifts in thinking 
about the brain – for example, the challenge to free will and criminal 
responsibility posed by the ability to provide a biological basis for decision-
making and choice.34 Some commentators believe that because of brain 
scanning, neuroscience will effectively take over some areas of law.35  
                                                           
28  Waldby (2000), p 20. 
29  Franklin (1998), p 103. 
30  Rose (2004), p 5. 
31  Natasha Mitchell interview with Lone Frank, ‘All in the Mind’, ABC Radio National, 
29 May 2010, www.abc.net.au/rn/allinthemind/stories/2010/2909156.htm. 
32  Frank (2009), p 13. 
33  Martin (2010), p 367. 
34  See, for example, Aharoni et al (2008). 
35  ‘As with so many issues where modern scientific thinking confronts everyday realities, the 
people in the jury box are not rushing to embrace [question of free will]. Yet it is my 
contention that even those tough jurors will have no choice, because some day the issue 
will dominate the entire legal system.’ Gazzaniga (2005), p 88. 
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However, both Martin and Rose argue that law will be particularly 
impervious to the dominant scientific consensus on brain-based identity. 
Commenting on the much-discussed potential of brain-scanning 
technologies to undermine the legal concept of criminal responsibility, Rose 
points out that it is ‘prevailing notions of moral and political order’ that feed 
legal fictions of free will, autonomy and personal responsibility, not 
science.36 Former Lord Justice Sedley describes the courtroom experience of 
being presented with scientific evidence that shifts and even reverses over 
time, and where scientific experts on each side of a case present conflicting 
views. He writes that ‘in the absence of a confirmed or at least a compelling 
aetiology of human conduct … the law … goes on to construct its own 
paradigms of human responsibility from its experience of two chief things: 
the ambit of human frailty and the social consequences of irresponsibility’.37 
Furthermore, Rose argues that the legal trend is towards greater culpability 
and individual responsibility. Functional brain imaging evidence may indeed 
influence against mitigation: ‘For if antisocial conduct is indelibly inscribed 
in the body of the offender, reform appears more difficult, and mitigation of 
punishment inappropriate.’38 
If law is indeed more impervious to the dominant scientific take on 
brains, will these major shifts in thinking about the brain have any effect? 
Rose suggests that a control model will win out and that an intensified 
biological regulation/self-regulation is the most likely outcome. This will not 
mean that individuals will have reduced moral responsibility under law 
because of biological factors that might make unlawful actions seem 
predetermined, but that screening will become a ubiquitous way of 
identifying and avoiding the risk of unwanted patterns of behaviour. In fact, 
Rose predicts that in place of the Foucauldian ‘discipline and punish’, a 
regulatory regime he terms ‘screen and intervene’ – a way of using fMRI to 
predict and therapeutically mitigate against the possibility of unlawful (or 
otherwise undesirable) behaviour – will emerge.39 
The Open Brain as Embedded and Embodied 
I argue instead for a way of seeing the new brain that might avoid both the 
limitations of the black box model, with its atomistic sense of self, and the 
control model represented by Rose’s screened and regulated neurochemical 
subjects. An alternative to these, implicit in the scientific findings of fMRI 
scanning and plasticity but not articulated in mainstream representations, is 
an open brain, structured through interaction with the environment and 
others. Without any clear border, the brain is more accurately acknowledged 
                                                           
36  Rose (2007), p 235. 
37  Sedley (2004), pp 128–29. Sedley also states: ‘We do not know what we shall do if 
aggression turns out one day to be biologically determined, or if pharmacological or 
genetic intervention becomes able to produce results which fines or treatments do not 
achieve.’  
38  Rose (2010), p 84. 
39  Rose (2010). 
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as both embodied and embedded – embodied because it is inseparable from 
its functioning within the body, and embedded in its environment and in 
other people. 
Clearly, the brain is embodied within a nervous system, but it is also 
inseparable from the whole complex of biological systems that make up the 
human body. Wilson writes that ‘there is no such thing as a brain, there is 
always a brain and another system’.40 Wilson’s work on the gut shows that 
the work of anti-depressants – commonly thought as directly impacting 
seratonin levels in the brain, and easily conceptualised as a therapeutic 
neurological intervention – is in fact imbricated in a complex of bodily 
systems, including ‘enzymes in the liver, conditions in the gut lumen, and 
the psychocultural milieu governing diet’.41 The most expansive 
understanding of the brain sees it as embedded in a set of bodily relations, 
from which it cannot meaningfully be separated. 
As well as being embodied in a unique and complex set of interlocked 
biological systems, the brain and associated body systems are embedded in a 
physical and social context.42 As demonstrated by the plasticity of its 
structure, the brain is in a constant process of change – far from static, it is ‘a 
relational organ’.43 Wilson makes this point when she describes the 
chemistry of the brain as embedded in ‘the psychocultural milieu governing 
diet’, because the types of foods consumed within a specific culture will 
have differing proportions of, for example, carbohydrates or dairy foods, 
which will determine the level of body products such as insulin in the blood, 
which will in turn impact the uptake of amino acids (a building block of 
seratonin) to the brain via the gut. Another example lies in the way the brain 
intermingles with its current environment to record information intake, 
matching environmental cues with memory retrieval: 
[The brain] colors the terms of the Versailles Treaty with the wasted 
fluorescent glow of the dorm study room, say; or the elements of the 
Marshall Plan with the jade-curtain shade of the willow tree in the 
backyard.44  
As well as being fundamentally integrated into the body and 
environment, the brain is ‘perpetually altered by every encounter, every 
interaction’.45 In every conversation, through every slight shift in 
                                                           
40  Wilson (2006), paraphrasing psychoanalyst Winnicott, p 130. 
41  Wilson (2006), p 129, writes: ‘Just how isolated and autocratic is the brain? … Notions of 
the brain as an autonomous, self-contained organ are common enough in both the 
scientific and popular imaginary … [As we follow the data on the brain-blood barrier we 
find that] … the brain is always, necessarily implicated in relations with other organs and 
other extra-bodily systems; the blood-brain barrier is one particularly intensive site for 
such xenobiotic transmissions.’ 
42  ‘Our brains and minds are not only embodied but embedded in the social and physical 
environment with which we engage.’ Glannon (2009), p 325. 
43  Glannon (2009), p 328. 
44  ‘Forget What You Know About Good Study Habits’, New York Times, 6 September 2010. 
45  Doidge (2010), p 209. 
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environment, every tiny nuance of touch, smell or taste, the brain is radically 
open, constantly responding and restructuring. 
Theorists such as Glannon refer to this interaction of the brain with 
body and environment as the ‘distributed mind’, meaning that consciousness 
cannot be reduced to the brain, but is distributed between brain, body and 
environment.46 But the brain can no longer be confined to the organ itself. 
Where, after all, are the meaningful boundaries of a brain that is 
intermingled to such a radical degree with body systems, environment and 
other people? 
The open brain model is closer to the work of Haraway, who presents 
the body and its biological systems as inevitably intertwined and 
interdependent, teeming with life of all sorts and inseparable from 
technology. Haraway has written extensively about the essential porosity of 
the human body, and in her most recent work she describes the body as 
dependent on other species for existence, saying that: ‘To be one is always to 
become with many.’47 If we are radically open – shaping and being shaped 
by each other through interaction – then our brains are also ‘becoming with’ 
each other, as well as with other species and our environment. ‘Becoming 
with’ captures the two elements of the brain whose significance is being 
underplayed in current writing on neuroscience and which are crucial to an 
open brain approach: ‘becoming’ captures the lack of stasis over time, the 
brain in constant change, and ‘with’ captures the central role of relationships 
in the structuring and restructuring of the brain. 
Law, Disability and the Open Brain 
What would the ‘open brain’ model mean for law if the ‘black box’ model is 
a foundational characteristic of the liberal legal subject, and the control 
model, represented by Rose’s negative prediction of a ‘screen and intervene’ 
future, bypasses law for neurochemical intervention? Surprisingly, since it is 
more commonly in harmony with the controlling rather than the radical 
aspects of emerging technologies, law has gone some way towards 
acknowledging the embeddedness of identity in an area that deals with the 
diversity of brains as well as other body types: disability discrimination 
laws. 
The Deficit and Social Models of Disability 
Traditional definitions of disability have relied on what is termed the 
‘deficit’ or ‘medical’ model of disability. A reductionist model (like brain-
based views of consciousness), the deficit model locates disability solely in 
the body of the person with the impairment. On this view, if the impairment 
                                                           
46  Glannon (2009), p 329. 
47  Haraway (2008), p 4.  
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could only be removed, cured or eradicated, there would be no disability, no 
ground for discrimination and no problem for law to redress.48  
Discrimination laws have largely followed what could be termed a 
‘deficit’ model of identity. They locate the protected attribute – race or sex, 
for example – in the bodies of those who are already stigmatised for those 
attributes. Thus it is the body, already hypervisible as raced or sexed, that is 
on display and that then becomes further associated with vulnerability and 
disadvantage: 
It is the stigmatized body that is made to ‘wear’ embodiment: the 
normalized body remains clean of bodily flaws and vulnerabilities. 
While acknowledging embodiment means that discrimination law is 
grounded in the reality of daily life, the one-sidedness of the 
acknowledgment reinscribes the relative privilege and disadvantage 
of the parties.49 
In other words, a deficit model in discrimination law leaves privilege intact: 
what it means to have a ‘normal’ body is not interrogated, since normalised 
bodies are not identified as raced, sexed or disabled. In fact, this model 
contributes to the normalisation of certain bodies, in part through the co-
creation of a category of ‘disability’. The deficit model is a way of 
protecting particular disadvantaged groups of people, but clearly carries with 
it a heavy burden.  
Compared with the deficit model, the social model is a welcome shift of 
attention. The social model of disability locates disability not in the body of 
the person with the impairment, but in the society that sets up the conditions 
for attendant suffering and exclusion.50 It is this suffering and exclusion that, 
on the social model, is the disability. Buildings without ramps, taxis that do 
not accommodate wheelchairs, colleagues who cannot sign, documents in 
formats that cannot be electronically read to the sight-impaired, working 
hours that do not accommodate chronic illness – these create disability, since 
without them, the argument goes, impairment would not result in a 
constrained public life. On the social model, disability is ‘the disadvantage 
or restriction of activity caused by a contemporary social organization which 
takes no or little account of people who have … impairments and thus 
excludes them from the mainstream of social activities’.51 In its strongest 
form, the social model holds that disability is ‘solely the result of created 
social exclusion’, and in its minimal form it holds society responsible for 
accommodating people with impairments so that they are effectively not 
disabled.52 Social disability activists acknowledge impairment in the body, 
                                                           
48  For a discussion of some of the theoretical debates around the construction of disability, 
see Karpin and Savell (forthcoming 2012), Ch 1. 
49  O’Connell, 2009, p 144. 
50  See Shakespeare (2006); Thomas and Corker (2002); Thomas (2007), Ch 3. 
51  Statement by the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS) in 1976, 
cited in Thomas (2007), p 52. 
52  Baker (2006), p 177. 
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but the distinction between biological impairment and social disability, and a 
focus on the latter, are ‘at the heart of the social model’.53 
The social model has influenced disability politics and studies, but in its 
more extreme forms it has justifiably been criticised, often by feminist 
scholars, for its various theoretical gaps – such as the tendency to ignore 
embodied experience54 and to leave ‘impairment’ unexamined, as if 
impairment is not also socially constructed.55 It has also been criticised for 
the simplistic division between ‘impairment’ and ‘disability’ – Shakespeare 
asks whether, for example, it is possible to say whether a woman with 
multiple sclerosis is depressed because of impairment effects or society56 – 
and for its assumption that all disability can be ‘removed’ by social 
changes.57 It is impossible to imagine a society in which all impairments are 
ideally accounted for, since what suits one person’s situation will not suit 
others.58  
Shakespeare argues that the social model is ‘not a theory, an idea or a 
concept’, and that more sophisticated models are needed.59 Yet the social 
model is an important antidote to the deficit model, which retains enormous 
force in medicine and in law,60 and a key means of shifting the focus in 
discrimination law from the individual to the society and from direct to 
systemic discrimination, and of creating more meaningful equality laws. The 
social model, as discussed below, did impact the development of federal 
disability discrimination laws in ways that are important if not sufficient. 
The social element should remain a component of thinking about disability, 
discrimination and the brain, as an impetus to scrutinise how ability and 
disability are constructed. This is a theoretical orientation, rather than a 
definitive framework that directs thinking to aspects of discrimination that 
are often overlooked.  
In terms of the competing brain-based identity models, the deficit 
approach evokes the control model of the brain, with its focus on biology 
and intervention at the level of the individual. In contrast, a social orientation 
towards disability resonates with the ‘open’ idea of the brain: it makes no 
sense to see disability, the body or the brain in isolation from the set of 
social and cultural systems in which it is embedded. A social model alone is 
insufficient for brain-based or disabled identity, however, since it is the 
interplay of the social with the biological that allows for a more nuanced 
approach. 
                                                           
53  Thomas (2007), p 69. 
54  See, for example, Wendell (1996). 
55  Davis (2006), p 237. 
56  Shakespeare (2006). 
57  Scully (2008), p 26. 
58  Scully (2008) 
59  Shakespeare (2006), p 203. 
60  See Frazee et al (2006). 
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Contemporary disability theorists are building the kinds of sophisticated 
models that Shakespeare desires – models that reflect the layering of 
relations that create, sustain and give meaning to impairments over time.61 
As Thomas puts it, the body is ‘simultaneously biological, material and 
social’,62 but the strength that will be given to each of these elements is 
clearly contextual, and which strands – if any – will exert influence over law 
and policy reform is yet to be seen. A promising development is the recent 
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which states: 
Recognizing that disability is an evolving concept and that disability 
results from the interaction between persons with impairments and 
attitudinal and environmental barriers that hinders their full and 
effective participation in society on an equal basis with others …63 
This definition acknowledges the relational and temporal aspects of identity 
that are key elements of the open brain model: disability (and ability) evolve 
over time, in relation to others and the environment in which they are 
situated. 
Models of Identity and the Disability Discrimination Act 
As discussed above, the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (‘the 
DDA’), was influenced by the social model of disability. The federal 
Disability Discrimination Act defines disability broadly. Section 4 states: 
‘disability’, in relation to a person, means:  
(a) total or partial loss of the person's bodily or mental functions; 
or  
(b) total or partial loss of a part of the body; or  
(c) the presence in the body of organisms causing disease or 
illness; or  
(d) the presence in the body of organisms capable of causing 
disease or illness; or  
(e) the malfunction, malformation or disfigurement of a part of the 
person’s body; or  
(f) a disorder or malfunction that results in the person learning 
differently from a person without the disorder or malfunction; 
or  
(g) a disorder, illness or disease that affects a person’s thought 
processes, perception of reality, emotions or judgment or that 
results in disturbed behaviour;  
and includes a disability that:  
(h) presently exists; or  
(i) previously existed but no longer exists; or  
                                                           
61  Frazee et al (2009), p 226. 
62  Carol Thomas, cited in Scully (2008), p 29. 
63  ‘Preamble’, UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, s (e). 
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(j) may exist in the future (including because of a genetic 
predisposition to that disability); or  
(k) is imputed to a person.  
To avoid doubt, a disability that is otherwise covered by this 
definition includes behaviour that is a symptom or manifestation of 
the disability.  
This incorporates elements of the ‘social model’ of disability, by 
including disabilities that no longer exist, or may yet exist, or are imputed – 
in other words, disabilities that exist through relationship with others and 
over time. This resonates with the open brain model by reflecting the process 
of ‘becoming with’; as with the UN Convention on the Rights of People 
With Disabilities, the definition acknowledges that disability may emerge 
over time, being projected into past and future, and that it comes to be only 
in relationship to another. Baker and Campbell point out that the definitional 
sections of the DDA ‘not only invoke the fluid and temporal aspects of 
“embodiment”; they recognize the constructed and relational dynamics of 
disability as a signifier’.64 
The DDA also establishes layers of responsibility for preventing 
discrimination against a person with a disability (or impairment). There are 
individual complaints mechanisms, in which a person who has been treated 
less favourably in a defined area of public life may seek redress from 
another individual or organisation. There is also legislative provision for 
‘action plans’ to encourage organisations and service providers to actively 
adopt measures to address their own institutional barriers to equality.65 
Finally, the DDA allows for the development of standards,66 aimed at more 
systemic forms of discrimination and designed as ‘educative mechanisms to 
mould the proper attitude towards people with disabilities and their carers, 
and to rid society of stigma based on lack of understanding’.67 All of these 
measures have had some success, although they have also been criticised for 
not going far enough,68 but more importantly they further represent a legal 
approach to identity-based harms that distributes responsibility across a 
spectrum from the individual to the institution to the state. Basser and Jones 
refer to this as a ‘three-dimensional approach’ with the potential to 
genuinely ‘operationalise’ human rights for people with disability because it 
allows for involvement at all levels of society.69 
The model of disability reflected in the DDA holds out promise as a 
model for embedded identity, since it finds that the ‘identity’ of being 
disabled resides throughout layers, from individual to social. This gives the 
DDA further resonance with a view of the brain that is embodied and 
                                                           
64  Baker and Campbell (2006), p 326 
65  Sections 59–65 of the Disability Discrimination Act. 
66  Section 31. 
67  Basser and Jones (2002), p 84. 
68  See discussion, for example, of the Purvis case below. 
69  Basser and Jones (2002). 
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embedded. However, in practice the DDA does not fulfil the promise of 
being a legal model for an embedded identity. This can be illustrated by a 
case study of disability discrimination: people with neurological disorders 
that manifest with anti-social behaviours. First, however, it is useful to turn 
to the writings of a sub-group of people with neurological conditions who 
see themselves as different, not deficient: neurodiversity activists. 
Neurodiversity and the Open Brain  
The social model of disability – and the brain – is strongly reflected in the 
writings of contemporary neurodiversity activists, mostly those on what is 
commonly called the ‘high-functioning’ end of the autism spectrum, but also 
those with Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD), Tourette’s Syndrome or other 
neurological conditions.70  
Advances in medical science – particularly neurological and genetic 
sciences – are expanding the set of behaviours – from aggression to 
addiction – that might be categorised as disabilities. In addition, in recent 
years (and for contested reasons ranging from environmental causes to more 
rigorous diagnosis) there has been a significant increase in the prevalence of 
neurological conditions such as autism, Asperger’s Syndrome and ADHD. 
The rapid increase in the numbers of people exhibiting these neurological 
traits, as well as a range of new categories and descriptors of neurological 
impairment, led one journalist to comment on the ‘shrinking subset of [the] 
neurologically normal’.71 
The increase in size and scope of the neurologically atypical population 
has been accompanied by a social movement that calls for acknowledgment 
of and respect for neurodiversity. Websites such as ‘Aspergian Pride’ and 
‘neurodiversity.com’ promote the belief that neurological difference should 
be celebrated rather than cured, and that cognitive divergence is part of the 
rich variation of humankind. The ‘problem’, neurodiversity activists argue, 
lies squarely with the ‘neurotypical’ society that cannot accept different 
ways of thinking or behaving. Some even claim that the characteristics of 
their supposed impairment, far from being disabling, are ideally adapted for 
contemporary life. Singer, for example, argues that autistics are best able to 
function in a computer age: 
Consider how computers force us to deal with an overwhelming 
onslaught of pure information, minus emotional cues and feedback, 
                                                           
70  The term ‘autism spectrum’ is itself problematic: journalist Andrew Soloman (2008) 
refers to it as a ‘three-dimensional universe of behaviours as challenging to define as the 
notion of human personality itself’. It is important to note here that there are many on the 
spectrum, or with other neurological impairments, who disagree with neuroactivists, who 
do express a desire to be ‘cured’ of autism or whose cognitive or communication skills are 
too impaired to express a view. The politics of autism identity are highly contentious, but 
this article focuses on those in the highly vocal and articulate pro-neurodiversity sub-
group because of the particular challenge they offer to law in its approach to disability. 
71  ‘Neurodiversity Forever: The Disability Movement Turns to Brains’, New York Times, 
9 May 2004. 
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how they replace the complexities of intuitive decision-making with 
simplified, rule-based machine logic. When these simplistic systems 
cannot respond fluidly enough to complex realities, even NTs 
[neurotypicals] can be reduced to the frustrated head-banging rage 
which is the old hallmark of autism. If every age has its ‘disease 
metaphor’, then is autism the metaphoric ‘disease’ for the era of the 
Internet?72 
Neurodioversity activists present an intensified version of the ‘social 
model’, making society not only responsible for the barriers that make their 
neurological makeup into a disability, and contesting that there is any 
impairment at all outside of the social construction of it – but further, 
locating disability in the people, the ‘neurotypicals’, who generally get to 
enjoy the privilege of being ‘normal’.  
Neurodiversity activists do not, however, have a model of identity that 
is particularly complex or embedded. Ortega has pointed out the 
reductionism of much of the language: neurodiversity activists do not use the 
phrase ‘people with autism’ because, they say, they are autistics. They 
describe autism as being ‘differently wired’ and locate it clearly in the brain. 
In fact, they often describe themselves as their brains.73 Nevertheless, 
neurodiversity poses a challenge to law because it offers a way of seeing the 
‘disabled’ brain that is in keeping with other activist movements that have 
driven legal protection for other identity-based groups by framing 
stigmatised difference as positive diversity. 
So how does law deal with the neurologically diverse? Since the DDA, 
more than other anti-discrimination laws, makes some effort to embed 
identity in a social context, we might expect that it is able to respond 
effectively to people discriminated against for these neurological disorders. 
Sadly, that is not the case. Discrimination law still struggles to deal with the 
neurologically different. For example, in the Purvis case, the High Court of 
Australia interpreted disability discrimination laws narrowly to deny legal 
protection to a school student displaying aggression and atypical behaviour.74 
A spate of recent cases in the same field – disability claims against schools 
by students with autism, learning or behavioural issues – shows that the 
issues of exclusion or unfavourable treatment remain, but after Purvis the 
possibility of successfully bringing a direct discrimination case on the basis 
of behavioural issues is remote.75 
                                                           
72  Singer (1999), p 66. 
73  Ortega (2009).  
74  Purvis v New South Wales (2003) 202 ALR 133. This case has been criticised by many 
commentators: for one example, see Campbell (2005). 
75  See, for example, Alex Walker v State of Victoria [2011] FCA 258; Abela v State of 
Vicoria [2011] FMCA 331 (2 May 2011) (still proceeding); Ives & Ors v Kilvington 
Grammar Ltd & Anor [2008] FMCA 1414 (30 October 2008) (settled out of court); 
Mason & Anor v Methodist Ladies College [2009] FMCA 570 (17 June 2009) (settled out 
of court); State of Victoria v Turner [2009] VSC 66 (4 March 2009) (appeal of successful 
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So why does the more complex model of disability allowed for in the 
DDA appear to be having little impact on individual cases of 
neurodiscrimination? Unfortunately, while the DDA acknowledges social 
responsibility for disability, each of the limbs – individual, institutional and 
community – operates separately, so that while a school may be subject to 
education standards or even have an action plan, an individual complaint 
will still be determined by the traditional deficit definition of disability, 
rather than the more radical idea of disability as located within the school 
and wider society. In the recent case of Walker, involving a child on the 
autism spectrum who was excluded from school on various occasions, it was 
clear that for students with atypical and difficult behaviours, the legal and 
social tendency is to view them as troublesome individuals without a secure 
place in public life.76 In the workplace, too, the effect of disability 
discrimination laws in practice is individualized rather than social: 
From the perspective of the person with ADHD, attention focuses on 
their ‘not normal’ behaviour, rather than on the excessively rigid 
‘normality’ of the workplace. The law’s attempts to ameliorate this 
rigidity, through provisions which recognize indirect discrimination 
and which require adjustments to be made, do not alter the threshold 
obstacle for a person with ADHD who has to characterize their 
cognitive function as a disability and take responsibility for 
challenging the appropriateness of workplace arrangements.77 
While the DDA has incorporated elements of an embedded identity, it 
is important to remember that discrimination law is embedded too – within a 
legal culture shaped around an understanding of identity as individual and 
autonomous, the self-contained boxes described earlier in this article. For 
those outside the neurological ‘norm’, law still approaches what is atypical 
about their brains and corresponding behaviour as the ‘problem’ to be 
addressed. A deficit and control model has trumped the more sophisticated 
social and open models in the application of these laws. Again, the 
underlying sense is that if only the brains of those with autism could be 
‘fixed’, the problem of discrimination would disappear. 
And there are significant attempts being made to cure conditions that 
are, or are suspected of being, neurologically based – particularly autism.78 
Recent media stories have reported on a scan that is claimed to diagnose an 
autistic individual within fifteen minutes.79 But when one part of the brain is 
                                                                                                                              
indirect discrimination case). For the impact of Purvis on potential discrimination claims 
by employees with ADD, see Arnold et al (2010).  
76  Walker v State of Victoria [2011] FCA 258. 
77  Arnold et al (2010), p 375. 
78  The powerful United States-based research group Autism Speaks (www.autismspeaks.org) 
is one example of the significant effort and funds being put into autism research. 
79  Alok Jha (2010) ‘Autism Can Be Diagnosed With Brain Scan – Study’, The Guardian, 
10 August 2010. A response criticising the research conclusions was published shortly 
after: Carl Heneghan (2010) ‘Why Autism Can’t Be Diagnosed with Brain Scans’, The 
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identified as functioning differently to ‘normal’ brains in autistic research 
subjects, what does this mean? These scans may be identifying some kind of 
atypical brain feature, but whether it is negatively atypical is a much harder 
question – a social question. Research projects such as these already 
presume a brain in need of therapeutic intervention. 
With the prompting of neurodiversity commentators, this raises the 
question of what is lost if neurological diversity can be screened for possible 
intervention. The neurodiversity community would no doubt argue that a 
‘screen and intervene’ approach, if successful, would be an eradication of a 
positive variation in human neurology, similar to the way some sections of 
the deaf community view attempts to medically eradicate deafness. Viewing 
the autistic brain on a reductionist or individualistic model neglects the 
possibility of what a differently ordered brain might have to offer. 
Neuroscientist Antonio Damasio has commented that connecting autistic 
traits to brain functioning ‘is going to be a rather relentless process as there 
are more and more discoveries of people that have something that could be 
called a defect and yet have immense talents in one way or another’.80 
Conclusion 
There are at least two contenders for a brain-based identity to replace the 
‘black box’ of the brain: a reductionist, control model, of Rose’s ‘screen and 
intervene’, the regulated and self-regulated neurochemical self; and an – 
admittedly quieter – ‘open model’ of a self embedded in otherness and 
changing over time.  
The neurologically atypical brain can be viewed differently via the open 
brain model. The open brain model gives an orientation towards the body 
and environment in which the brain is embedded. For example, in a ‘control’ 
society of the sort Rose describes, where self-scrutiny and self-regulation are 
the social norm, atypical behaviours are more unsettling and unacceptable. 
Those who are advocating a neurodiversity approach are not good 
neurochemical citizens, self-monitoring and self-controlling, according to a 
socio-medical ideal. Through their failed citizenship, they challenge the idea 
of self-regulation, and instead pose the question of what a society would 
look like that was more tolerant of a range of behaviours and neurological 
styles. Ironically, given autism’s association with isolation and anti-social 
behaviour, they refuse to accept individualist readings of disabled identity, 
arguing that their construction as ‘disabled’ is dependent on a particular 
social reading of their brains. 
The future that Rose foresees, where identity is pre-emptively 
controlled through neurotechnologies, bypasses law, with all its flawed but 
important attempts to protect people from identity-based harm. The open 
                                                                                                                              
Guardian, 12 August 2010. Another brain scanning research project is the Infant Brain 
Imaging Study (IBIS), which is scanning infants with an older sibling on the autism 
spectrum: www.ibis-network.org.  
80  Cited in ‘Neurodiversity Forever: The Disability Movement Turns to Brains’, New York 
Times, 9 May 2004. 
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model of the brain is not one that provides an essentialist identity as a basis 
for law: its very point is that identity is never static or complete. What it 
does allow for is the possibility of an ongoing orientation towards how 
identity is being constructed, and attention to the various layers that play in 
its construction. 
The control model also takes us away from the idea of ‘unknowability’ 
as a source of ethics, by asserting that even the most seemingly private 
aspect of identity is in fact knowable and potentially subject to regulation, 
without allowing for any alternative. In contrast, the open brain approach 
reveals that once the inherent ‘unknowability’ of the self is removed as an 
element in the construction of identity, another kind of relation to the Other 
emerges. Neuroimaging and plasticity reveal the self-as-otherness, the self 
constitutive of and embedded in the Other, even as the self is 
correspondingly remade. It is no longer the ‘stranger within’ that is the 
source of the ethical relation, but the ‘otherness in each other’ that orients 
the individual to how the other fares. Emerging brain-based technologies 
have showed us that we are not sets of black boxes, closed and unreadable, 
but nor are we knowable in any uncomplicated sense – we are something 
equally mysterious and deep, even if that depth is located, in part, outside of 
ourselves. 
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